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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite all homage paid to the existence of an employer's statutory
obligation to furnish information to a union,1 the National Labor
Relations Act 2 (the NLRA or the Act) is painfully silent on this point.
Rather, the courts and the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or
the Board) have found a disclosure requirement in the duty to bargain in
good faith mandated by sections 8(a)(5)3 and 8(d)4 of the Act. The dearth
of legislative history in connection with the enactment of these two sections
indicates that the absence of a disclosure requirement was not a conscious
omission by the drafters, but rather a failure either to take notice of the
problem or to understand it. In the area of wages and hours-where the
union's need for information has been deemed most critical-the courts
and the Board have developed a substantial body of law regulating an
employer's duty to disclose. In other areas of economic data, however, the
disclosure issue has arisen with less frequency, at least in part because
unions rarely attempt to expand the scope of information available to
them under the broad language of the case law.
American disclosure rules are predicated on an adversary system of
labor relations. After considering the present state of the law and the
prospects for expanding the present disclosure requirements beyond the
arena of wage and wage-related data, this Article will consider means of
improving cooperation between management and labor through greater
disclosure of information to unions, and whether these means should be
accomplished by further judicial or quasi-judicial inventiveness, or by
statute or regulation modeled upon the experiences of Belgium, Great
Britain, and West Germany. Finally, this Article will focus upon the role of
disclosure in shaping the future direction of American labor-management
relations.
II. STATUS OF DISCLOSURE UNDER EXISTING LAW
A. Availability of Wage and Wage-Related Data
Congress' asserted purpose in enacting a comprehensive labor
* Attorney. City of New York Law Department, J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1979
1. See. e.g.. B. GOTTLIEB & C. WERNER, STATUTORY OBLIGATION OF AN EMPLOYER TO FURNISH
INFORMATION TO A UNION (rev. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GOTTLIEB & WERNER].
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
3. Id. at § 158(a)(5).
4. Id. at § 158(d).
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relations statute in 19355 was to pave "the way for cooperation and mutual
progress" towards the goal of promoting industrial peace.6 Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act imposes on each employer the duty to bargain collectively with
the representative of its employees.7 Section 8(d) of the Act, added in 1947,
defines the scope of this duty as extending to all matters relating to "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."8
In order for a certified union to fulfill successfully its role as the
collective bargaining representative of its members, it must be able to
secure the knowledge necessary to formulate reasonable demands upon
the employer and to engage in reasoned decision-making.9 These
informational needs of a union are not limited only to its role in
negotiation of collective agreements, but rather extend far beyond to
include contract administration as well. 1° In response to these union needs,
the courts and the Board have superimposed upon an employer's statutory
obligation to bargain a duty to furnish the union with data relevant and
necessary to the union's functions as collective bargaining agent.'
A union's request for information is to be judged by a standard of
relevancy imported to the labor-management relations area from the
5. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 65 Stat.
601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 88 Stat. 395 (1974) [codified at29 U.S.C. § 151-169
(1976)].
6. 79 CONG. REC. 7661 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
8. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
9. See NLRB v. Whittin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593,594 (4th Cir. 1954); Anaconda Am. Brass,
148 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (1964).
10. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
11. These data have been found to include: lists of names and addresses of unit employees, see,
e.g., United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 933 (1971);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969); wage rates and
job classifications, see, e.g., NLRB v. Rockwell Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1969); Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965); Boston Hearld Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d
58 (lst Cir. 1955) (matching individual employees to job classifications, length of service and salaries);
NLRB v. Whittin Mach. Works. 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187
F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951); B. F. Diamond Constr. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 161, enforced per curiam, 410 F.2d
462 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Lock Joint Pipe Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 943 (1963);
methods used by employers to establishwage rates, see, e.g., Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1966) (piece rates); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963). cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964): J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Otis
Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953) (time study data and methods of compiling same); Glen
Raven Knitting Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 422 (1956) rev'd on other grounds, 235 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1956)
(data on style construction where related to piece wage rates); Skyland Hosiery Mills, 108 N.L.R.B.
1600 (1954) (rate used to determine lost time as to each employee); benefits, see, e.g., Sylvania Elec.
Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 591 (Ist Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966) (information
regarding welfare fund, where union seeks it to make choice between welfare benefits and take home
pay); Cone Mills Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 449 (1968), modified on other grounds, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir.
1969) (actuarial assumptions underlying pension plan); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850
(1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953) (pension data); overtime
hours worked by unit employees, see, e.g., Gulf State Asphalt Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 405 (1969); job
evaluation, see, e.g., Anaconda Am. Brass, 148 N.L.R.B.474(1964); New Britain Mach., 105 N.L.R.B.
646 (1953) enforced, 210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); and profit sharing, see, e.g.. NLRB
v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1967) (employer must furnish price list where
necessary to determination of profit sharing).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. t2 When wage or wage-related data have
been requested by the union, a presumption of relevance has been found to
attach; thus, the union need not adduce specific evidence of relevance
before the employer's duty to disclose arises. 3 When the requested
information is deemed to be presumptively relevant, the employer cannot
set up a defense of confidentiality, 4 nor can he claim a good faith belief
that he is not required to bargain with the union. 5 Moreover, it does not
matter that the union has an ulterior motive in requesting the information,
so long as the union's anterior purpose falls within the sphere of
legitimacy.
16
A similar presumption of relevance, however, has not been found to
attach to information other than wage and wage-related data. In such an
instance, the burden is placed on the union to prove the information's
relevance to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, 7 without
reference to the merits of the underlying claim.' 8 At least one court, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 19 has
gone so far as to hold that once the union meets its burden by showing the
relevance of the requested information, it is a per se violation of section
8(a)(5) for the employer to refuse to furnish the information.20
In addition to a union request for relevant information, an obligation
to disclose may also be triggered by the employer itself. If an employer
asserts, either by an explicit statement or by a pretextual rationale that
tends to obscure its true motives, its financial inability to meet the
12. See NLRB v. Jawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951).
13. While a brief discussion of the distinction between wage data and other economic data is
necessary for the purposes of this Article, a more thorough explication of this subject has been
undertaken elsewhere. See, e.g., GO-rLIEB & WERNER supra note I; Bartosic and Hartley, The
Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study ofthe Interplay ofAdministrative and
Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 23, 24-42 (1972); Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish
Information During the Contract Term, 9 GA. L. REv. 375, 376 (1975); Huston, Furnishing
Information as an Element of the Employer's Good Faith Bargaining. 35 U. DET. L. REv. 471,493-99
(1958); Note, Employer's Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining, 57 COL. L. REv.
112, 119 (1957).
14. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 754 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 971 (1964).
15. United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1207 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
933 (1971). Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969);
Utica Observer Dispatch, Ill N.L.R.B. 58 (1955), enforced, 229 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956).
16. For example, a request forsubcontracting data will be granted when the work affected is that
done by unit employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Puerto Rico Tel. Co.
v. NLRB. 359 F.2d 983 (Ist Cir. 1966); Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964 (1973); as will
requests for information concerning nonunit employees when it is necessary to show erosion of the
bargaining unit, see, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1964). But see NLRB v.
Western Elec. Corp., 559 F.2d 1131(8th Cir. 1977); International Tel. &Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d
366 (3d Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1089 (1967) (information denied as being not necessary to
union's performance of its duties).
17. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1964).
18. NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); B.F.
Diamond Constr. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 161 (1967), enforced per curiam, 410 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied. 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Ingalls Shipbldg. Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 712 (1963).
19. 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1964).
20. li. at 69.
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collective bargaining demands of the union, the employer brings upon
itself an obligation to substantiate its claim by disclosure to the union of
any relevant financial information. 1
Despite the apparently strong presumption of relevance that adheres
to wage and wage-related information, there is sufficient breadth in the
language of the case law to enable an employer's obligation to disclose to
be defeated through the combined effect of an enterprising employer and
an uninformed union. In NLRBv. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 22 the United
States Supreme Court left open this possibility by refusing to announce a
per se rule on the duty to disclose, holding instead that an employer's
refusal to disclose information requested by a union can be found to be an
unfair labor practice violative of the duty to bargain in good faith only
after consideration of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. 2 3 In certain limited circumstances, therefore, an employer can avoid
the duty to disclose by showing, for example, that the information sought
is of de minimis value to the union,2 4 or that a striking union has requested
a list of employees with no purpose other than to harass strikebreakers.25
Additionally, an employer may at times avoid a duty to disclose, in the
absence of a union request, by omitting reference to any cost issue in
refusing to accede to a union's collective bargaining demands.26
An employer-union conflict over the employer's obligation to disclose
financial information can arise in any of three different contexts. First, the
parties may disagree over the substance of the information, either as
requested or as provided. Second, the union and employer may differ on
the form in which the information will be supplied. An employer need not
furnish information that, as a matter of routine business practice, it does
not compile, or has not presently compiled into a manageable form.
Moreover, information that is under the control of an employer need not
21. The existence of an inability to pay claim as announced in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149 (1956); accord, Metlox Corp. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 103 (1967),
will be found, for example, if the employer claims that meeting union proposals would render the
company unable to maintain a proper balance of operations, NY Printing Pressman v. NLRB, 538
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1976), orif the employerasserts the necessity of maintaining his competitive position,
NLRB v. Western Wirebound Corp., 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966); accord, United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 434 (1968). But see Dallas Gen. Drivers v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(company's assertion it was already paying rates in excess of prevailing rates in same market does not
amount to a claim of inability to pay); Taylor Foundry Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 765 (1963), enforced, 338
F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964) (employer's assertion that it would have to go out of business if the wage
increase was granted, does not equal a claim of inability to pay).
22. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
23. Id. at 153.
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1962).
25. Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615,620 (9th Cir. 1972); Sign Pictorial Union v. NLRB, 419
F.2d 726, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1969), Little Rock Downtowners, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1308 (1964),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 341 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1965).
26. See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 128, 132 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 926 (1961) (company did not assert cost as a factor bearing on its willingness to consider union
proposals regarding insurance coverage); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 236 N.L.R.B. I (1978)
(diocese decision to close high school held a question of priorities, and not based on an inability to pay).
27. See, e.g., Emeryville Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971).
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be compiled into the precise form requested by the union, but rather may
be furnished to the union in its existing form.2 If the union's request for
financial data is stated broadly, the employer can select those vehicles
through which the information will be conveyed to the union,29 and can
impose reasonable conditions on the union's use and manner of inspection
of the materials. 3o A third union-employer conflict over disclosure of
financial information can arise in the context of the timeliness of the
union's attempt to secure the data. A union may lose its right to obtain
disclosure by making its requests at a time when the information is not
relevant to the subject matter at hand,31 or by engaging in dilatory tactics in
the face of the employer's attempts to comply with the union's requests.
32
B. Beyond the Presumption: Union Access to Broader Economic Data
1. Other Available Information
Although the obligation of an employer to disclose relevant financial
data appears to provide union access to a wide array of information
necessary to allow the union to bargain collectively and to police an
established labor agreement, closer analysis reveals that the information
contemplated by the obligation is but a small segment of a much broader
economic picture of the employer's enterprise. Information beyond the
scope of the presumption of relevance but nevertheless an integral part of
the management of a business includes, for example, management's
assessments of profitability, production and sales data-including costs,
time tables for production, and sales volume-information regarding
products and inventory, sales volume-information regarding products
and inventory, techniques and processes utilized by management in the
28. See, e.g., Ingalls Shipbldg. Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 712, 718 (1963).
29. See, e.g., Food Serv. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 790, 805 (1973) (when union's request for access to
records is made in general terms, it is not a violation of the Act for the employer to grant access only to
that information which the employer deems relevant).
30. See Ingalls Shipbldg. Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 712, 718 (1963) (if company believes there is
information in the rate books which does not pertain to wage determinations, it can make the
information relating to wages available in an alternate fashion); Yakima Frozen Foods, 130 N.L.R.B.
1269, 1272 (1961) (it is reasonable for company to insist that its books and records be audited by a
qualified accountant who is not in the union's employ).
31. Century Elec. Motor Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 941,946 (1971) (union waited until two weeks after
Christmas to request financial data to support the employer's refusal to pay Christmas bonuses);
Anaconda Am. Brass, 148 N.L.R.B. 474,478-79 (1964) (grievance had been dropped and request was
stale).
32. See Precision Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B., 183, 210 (1977) (union made belated demand for
books in an attempt to build a case against the company, and not in legitimate pursuance ofa statutory
right); Alkahn Silk Label Co., 193 N.L.R.B., 167, 172 (1971) (union neither described the desired
information accurately nor requested it in a timely manner); Memorial Consultants, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B.
I. 14 (1965) (although the union requested books as to all employees and the company offered
information only as to one group of employees to support its claims of inability to pay, the union never
attempted to inspect what the company did offer); Braswell Motor Freight Lines Inc., 141 N.L.R.B.
1154. 1163 (1963). enforced, 370 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (union failed to frame its request properly,
and then never attempted to examine the extensive information offered to it by management).
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course of production, and long-range forecasts of expansion or contraction
of the business. In addition to the general financial statements that are fur-
nished to shareholders, which unions can obtain by the simple act of pur-
chasing a share of stock, management has at its disposal a detailed break-
down of the financial posture of the enterprise, including methods of
capitalization and amounts of dividends declared. Moreover, manage-
ment often engages in a subjective analysis of the business, expressing in the
form of opinions its conclusions about and predictions for the company.
Since this management-related information typically is not within the
realm of wage and wage-related data, the presumptively relevant branch of
the duty to disclose does not dictate automatic union access to it.
Nevertheless, an employer may be required to disclose such management
information to the union if the union carries its burden of showing that the
information is relevant to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.33
Relevance, however, requires more than mere speculation by the union
concerning the usefulness of the requested information.34 Indeed, a
showing that the requested information may prove interesting or helpful to
the union may not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be a
sufficient ground to compel employer disclosure.35 Rather, to be relevant
and thus within the scope of the employer's duty to disclose, there must be
a probability that the requested information "is needed by the bargaining
representative for the proper performance of its [collective bargaining]
duties. 36
2. Relevance of Non- Wage Data
The broad variety of information compiled by management in the
normal course of business gives rise to the question whether the concept of
relevance, as applied under the duty to disclose, can be stretched to
encompass it. One would expect that management would take a narrow
view of the relevance concept, thereby excluding as much non-wage data as
possible from the scope of the duty to disclose, while labor conversely
would take an expansive view of the concept in an attempt to broaden the
informational base from which it must collectively bargain. This
divergence of views, and the resulting tendency to obscure the potential
reach of the relevance concept, may stem at least in part from the manner
in which the respective parties view their relationship with each other and
their responsibilities to the interests that they individually represent.
Rather than develop a spirit of mutual cooperation and trust, labor
and management have accepted a system in which both parties come to the
33. See Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 101, 105 (Ist Cir. 1978); Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3rd Cir. 1964); General Aniline & Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217,
1220 (1959).
34. San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863,868 (9th Cir. 1977); American Oil Co.,
164 N.L.R.B. 29, 34 (1967).
35. United Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1966).
36. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967).
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bargaining table as adversaries and litigate to judgment each bargainable
subject. Management sees its primary function as running the business as
efficiently as possible. Its ultimate goals are profit maximization, full
employment of resources, and low cost to consumers.37 Management
considers success to require quick, on-the-spot decisions, free of
interference from employees or their representatives. This claim to
noninterference is founded on the belief that, as representatives of the
corporation's owners, management is exercising property rights subsumed
under the heading of "management prerogatives. 38 Management
traditionally has viewed any union attempt to impair the free exercise of its
prerogatives as an intolerable intrusion on property rights.39
Unions, on the other hand, see maintenance of employment security
as a primary function. This goal, they feel, requires union involvement in
any management decision that affects the workers.4 ° Unions view
themselves as requiring detailed financial and management-related data in
order to negotiate and administer collective bargaining agreements, and to
act as watchdogs over corporate practices. 4'
This stance by union and management has led to acceptance of the
notion that the collective bargaining system is one in which both parties
must view each other as adversaries. Each side sees this hard line as the
crucial factor in its own survival. As a result, of two possible paths along
which American labor-management relations could have proceeded-one
of confrontation and the other of cooperation-a system of antagonism,
nurtured by mistrust and deception on both sides, has emerged. To
capitalize on the wisdom of Robert Frost, "the road not taken ' 42 by
37. D. CULLEN & M. GREENBAUM, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 9
(1966).
38. The President's National Labor Management Conference, Nov. 5-30, 1945, Summary and
Committee Reports, United States Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, BULLETIN No.
77, 57-59 (1947) [hereinafter cited as President's Conference]. Management summed up this area of
control in its Report to the President's National Labor Management Conference in 1945, as being those
matters with respect to which it was felt to be clearly the function and responsibility of management to
make prompt initial decisions to ensure the effective operation of the enterprise, and clearly not subject
to collective bargaining. These matters included the determination of products to be manufactured and
services to be rendered to the customer, the location of the business including the establishment of new
units and the relocation or closing of old units, the determination of layout and equipment to be used in
business processes, techniques, methods and means of manufacture and distribution, materials to be
used, size and character of inventory, determination of financial policies, general accounting
procedures, prices of goods sold or services rendered, organization of each distribution unit, selection
of employees for promotion, determination of job content, size of work force, allocation and
assignment of work, policies as to employee selection, quality standards, maintenance of discipline and
control, use of plant property, scheduling of operations and number of shifts, and determination of
health, safety, and protections.
39. Id. One must bear in mind that this attitude reflects the stance management representatives
were advocating in 1945, and whether they currently adhere to this line has become mooted over the
past 35 years by amendment of the National Labor Relations Act to include § 8(d) and the subsequent
expansion of the areas of bargainable subjects.
40. Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LABOR L.J. 143, 144
(1968).
41. Pillsburg, Organized Labor's View of Corporate Financial Information, 105 J. OF
ACCOUNTANCY 46, 55 (1948).
42. The Road Not Taken, reprintedin THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 105 (E. LATHAM, ed. 1969).
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American labor relations was one of cooperation and trust between the
parties in an effort to arrive at mutual ends. It is with the American or
antagonistic model in mind that one can begin to address the
considerations that have defined the scope of the relevance concept of the
duty to disclose, and to answer the question whether the road of
antagonism that American labor relations has taken has in fact made "all
the difference 43 in the manner in which the disclosure rules have evolved.
The Board and the courts generally have accepted management's
claim of a need for control of its business free from the constraints of union
interference. As a result, the duty to disclose has beenjudicially and quasi-
judicially constructed upon a foundation that consists, at least in part, of a
management prerogatives rationale. Thus, when the information
requested by the union does not fall within the category of wage and wage-
related data, such that the presumption of relevance does not attach, but
rather is concerned primarily with management-related data, the burden
falls upon the union to demonstrate that the subject matter of its request
bears a special relationship to a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. 4
The subjects of collective bargaining generally fall within one of three
classes: mandatory, permissive, and illegal.45 Mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining are those upon which the parties must negotiate in
good faith, although it is not necessary that the parties reach an
agreement 6 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner Corp.,47 the
Supreme Court, relying in part on sections 8(d) and 9(a) of the NLRA, held
that the mandatory obligation of an employer and union to bargain
collectively extends only to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
48
of employment. It is these mandatory bargaining subjects to which the
employer's duty to disclose relates.
Matters that fall outside the scope of "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment" but upon which the parties nevertheless
may bargain are the permissive subjects of collective bargaining.4 9 These
permissive subjects generally relate to the areas traditionally within the
control of either management or union: the so-called management
prerogatives and union prerogatives. 50 On these subjects, the parties can
agree to bargain or not, but a refusal to bargain by either party will not
constitute an unfair labor practice.51 Perhaps the most instructive
43. E. BAKKE, MUTUAL SURVIVAL 80 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BAKKE].
44. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
45. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 496-531 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN].
46. Id. at 496.
47. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
48. Id. at 348-49.
49. Id. at 349.
50. GORMAN, supra note 45, at 523.
51. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
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definition of the management prerogatives aspect of permissive collective
bargaining subjects is found in Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,52 in which the Justice stated
that management prerogatives are those
managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital, and the basic
scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of
employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d), is to describe a limited
area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those managerial decisions
which are fundamental to the basic direction of corporate enterprise or which
impinge only indirectly upon employment should be excluded from that
area. 3
With the duty to disclose limited by the less than bright line formula of
relevance to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and with the
relationship of the parties fixed in an antagonistic posture, an expansion of
the reach of relevancy may turn upon the ingenuity or lack thereof of the
parties. A creative union may be able to articulate its request for
information in a manner by which the request conforms to a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, even though the subject matter of the
request relates in fact to a permissive subject. This technique was utilized
effectively in Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. NLRB 54 to compel an
employer to disclose information about the cost of employee welfare
programs, despite the fact that the employer was not required to bargain
with the union over whether the employer was receiving the best coverage
for its money.5 In Sylvania Electric Products, the union had couched its
requests in terms of its need to weigh the value to the employees of an
increase in welfare benefits against an increase in take-home pay.
56
Although it can be argued that the Sylvania Electric Products holding that
the employer must comply with the union's request for information
extends the disclosure duty to permissive subjects of collective bargaining,
the court in Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. NLRB5 7 indicated that
the Sylvania Electric Products rationale would be limited to situations in
which there is a close nexus between the union's information request and a
mandatory subject: "Just as a union cannot compel an employer to bargain
over subjects that fall outside the ambit of 'wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment' it cannot bootstrap a demand for
information relating to nonmandatory matters by its unilateral assertion
of interest."'58
52. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
53. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
54. 358 F.2d 591 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 852 (1966).
55. Id. at 593.
56. Id.
57. 573 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 110.
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The issues of subcontracting and non-unit employees are particularly
fertile fields of inquiry for unions, and clearly evidence the linedrawing in
which the NLRB and the courts engage when acting on union information
requests, linedrawing that often appears to occur without consideration of
the underlying justifications for the requests. An employer generally need
not disclose subcontracting information to the union if the employer's
subcontracts do not divert work previously done by members of the
bargaining unit.5 9 The justification for this rule is twofold: first, depending
upon the facts of the particular circumstance, subcontracting by the
employer may not be an issue about which the employer is required by
section 8(a)(5) to bargain with the union; 60 second, the Board consistently
has held that a union may waive its right to any and all information on
subcontracting by agreeing to a management prerogatives clause in the
collective bargaining agreement between the parties.61 The second
rationale-waiver through a management prerogatives clause-is suscep-
tible to criticism. By agreeing to a management prerogatives clause, all that
the union has waived is the right to bargain about the subjects embraced by
management prerogatives, not the right to consider relevant information
in evaluation of its own position. The Board has not considered whether
the union could use this information to promote its own internal efficiency
in the interest of worker security, while still affording management the
benefit of its bargain. Without access to subcontracting information, a
union may not be able to assess whether it is pressing management too
hard in light of the services that outsiders are profitably offering to
management.
Information regarding non-unit employees is placed in a similar
category, in that, absent a showing by the union of erosion of the
bargaining unit because of non-unit workers, the information will be
deemed irrelevant.62 Cursory treatment also is given to requests for the
books and records of subsidiary or related corporations. Unless the union
is capable of demonstrating relevance to a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the requests will be denied with minimal inquiry into whether
the subsidiaries are being utilized as devices to siphon off funds or work of
the corporation with which the union is dealing, in an effort to defeat union
demands.
63
Given the acceptance of the antagonistic model of the collective
bargaining relationship, one would expect unions to have engaged in a
struggle with management over their right to access to this information. In
59. Id. at 106; Fifty Div. Hayes-Albion Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1971).
60. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209 (1964).
61. Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208, 209 (1952).
62. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
63. Adams Insulation Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 211,214 (1975). Cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570
F.2d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 1977) (limited financial data of the subsidiary became relevant upon parent's
assertion of inability to pay).
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relation to union efforts to secure wage and wage-related data, however,
the case law on disclosure of management-related information surprisingly
has been relatively meager. When the issue has been raised, the Board and
the courts have couched their denials of union requests in terms of the
union's failure to show relevance to a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.14 While union requests for wage and wage-related data
summarily are granted "in order to effectuate intelligent and efficacious
bargaining" by the union,65 requests for management-related information
generally are denied on the opposite ground; namely, that such data is not
necessary for intelligent bargaining." As a result, one is left free to
speculate on what is meant, at least by the Board and the courts, by
"intelligent bargaining." Their language lacks a supporting rationale. A
possible explanation for this absence of reasoning may lie in the Board's
tendency to affirm without opinion the rulings of administrative law
judges, thereby avoiding any necessity to explain these rulings. The results
of enforcement proceedings in the courts of appeals unfortunately shed no
additional light on the problem. The courts ascribe special expertise to the
NLRB, and engage in little independent analysis of these issues. Moreover,
the courts increasingly are becoming receptive to the defense of
confidentiality, which has precluded, for example, union access to
information such as operating and marketing programs,67 and executive
salaries and detailed reports of operating expenses.68
Although this Article has criticized the paucity of reasoning offered by
the Board and the courts for the disclosure rules, it must be recognized that
unions may be equally at fault. Unions have failed to exert sufficient
pressure on management to provide management-related information. It
may be that, in recognizing the need for distinct areas in which
management can make those quick judgments necessary for efficient and
successful operation of the business, unions have confused the need to
bargain with the need to know.
3. Practical Effects
By framing the issue in terms of relevance to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and by casting it in the light of principles of labor-
management confrontation, the Board and the courts have avoided any
analysis that might reflect an appreciation for potential union uses of
management-related information. The currently prevailing view appears
to be that the sole use to which unions would apply such data would be an
64. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1964).
65. See cases cited in notes 14 & 15 supra.
66. Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4,8-9 (Ist Cir. 1977), United Furniture Workers v.
NLRB, 388 F.2d 880, 883 (4th Cir. 1967); International Woodworkers v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485
(D.C. Cir. 1959); General Aniline & Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1959).
67. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 1968).
68. Metlox Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 378 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1967).
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attempt to wrest control from management. This perspective, however,
may prove too narrow. Rather than result in further confrontation
between labor and management, union access to and use of management-
related data may be a substantial step towards cooperation between the
parties.
Cooperation can be gained, however, through the consent of the con-
tracting parties.69 Concessions made by management in the form of in-
formation provided to foster the contractual relationship need not have
the effect of involving the union in the day-to-day functioning of the
enterprise. Rather, the information would enable the union, based on an
informed and realistic appraisal of the situation, to bargain for the most
suitable allocations of management's available resources.
The idea has been advanced that if unions would view worker
efficiency as a means of increasing the firm's earning power, and hence its
ability to pay increased wages, the union would be willing to offer
increased worker efficiency as part of the bargain. 70 This willingness
derives from an understanding of the employer's fiscal situation, which
puts the union in a position in which it will be unable to ignore the prob-
lems of a struggling company without inflicting the consequences on its
rank-and-file. 71 The union is not seeking access to the "property" of the
company, but rather is seeking data to obtain security for its workers and
perhaps, ultimately, for the plant itself.72 This result is possible in a
cooperative setting, in which management supplies information about
productivity, efficiency, and techniques despite the categorization of this
subject matter as management prerogatives." This result would be of
significant mutual benefit and, as will be explored subsequently, should be
unfettered by the present requirement of relevance.
There is evidence that cooperation yields results. Chief Executive of
American Can Company and Chairman of the National Association of
Manufacturers Industrial Relations Committee, William F. May, made
the following observation of his situation:
Open exchanges of information through clear channels of communication
are basic. I recall several situations where my company was faced with
uneconomical costs at some of its plants, and where we discussed the
circumstances with both the local and the international union represen-
tatives. After we had carefully explained all the facts, we had two types of
69. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 89-90 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as CHAMBERLAIN & KUHN].
70. Id. at 369-70.
71. See text following note 94 infra.
72. Id.
73. In General Aniline & Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1959),just this type of information was
denied to the union as it was used by management only to schedule work, and had no bearing on wage
rates. Likewise in Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1968), no refusal to bargain was found as
to an employer's refusal to turn over a report dealing with the scheduling of employee hours, as the
report was said to contain information about unique manufacturing processes utilized by the company
in production, and refusal was necessary to protect management's property rights.
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experiences. One where the union not only accepted the facts but agreed to
action to correct the situation; others where the union would take no action.
In the first instance, the plants have continued to progress and grow, while in
the latter case the plants have been closed. While agreements for wage cuts or
freezes are relatively uncommon, they demonstrate an awareness that
objectives other than the pursuit of "more" are in the nation's interest.74
Union-management cooperation in the area of cost and efficiency,
although not widespread, has been undertaken on a limited scale. The
Scanlon Plan was developed by union representative Joseph Scanlan in
1937 to reduce the costs of operating the employer's steel mill.7' The
philosophy of the plan is that efficiency depends on effective cooperation
through teamwork to reduce costs. 76 The plan presupposes mutual
confidence of labor and management. All supervisory and rank-and-file
employees are included and share in whatever bonus is earned by reference
to a prearranged formula.77 Monthly meetings are held at which union
representatives are given essential facts about the condition of the
company and the nature of the competition that it faces.78 Although
introduction of the plan has had varied success in different plants, one
standard result has been the encouragement of employees to take a
broader and more balanced view of their own interests.79 Contract
negotiations have been more realistic and informed, and both sides have
found that this facilitates reaching an agreement.80
A more recent example of cooperation yielding benefits for both
management and labor arose out of the financial crisis that struck one of
the "big three" automobile manufacturers, Chrysler Corporation.
Traditionally, the United Auto Workers engage in pattern bargaining; that
is, the contract negotiated with one of the three major manufacturer sets a
standard for the entire industry. All three manufacturers face the threat of
a strike until shortly before the existing contracts expire. The union then
chooses a target company that will be pressed for a settlement.81 The
bargaining in 1979 deviated from this scheme because of Chrysler's
precarious financial situation. When the Carter Administration predicted
a federal financial aid package for Chrysler on concessions by the Auto
Workers,82 the union exhibited the cooperation necessary to save both the
company and the jobs of its members. At the outset, the union ruled out
Chrysler as a strike target because of the ailing automaker's inability to
74. M. RUKEYSER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE POWER TO DESTROY 106-07 (1968).
75. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 864-65 (1960).
76. Id. at 865.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 868.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. WalI St. J., July 19, 1979 at 4, col. 2.
82. Id., Oct. 16, 1979 at 6, col 1.
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withstand such a blow.83 More dramatically, the terms of the negotiated
contract represented a break from those reached with Ford and General
Motors. Although the new contract provided for the annual wage
increases of three percent agreed to by Ford and General Motors, Chrysler
was permitted to delay the increase for six months in the first year of the
contract, four months in the second year, and two months in the third.84 At
that time, Chrysler employees were to reach parity with the rest of the
industry. Similarly, while the cost of living provisions met the industry
standard, Chrysler was permitted to delay implementation until December
1980, folding the cost of living allowance accumulated during the old
contract into the year-end paychecks of each employee. 85 This accumula-
tion normally is figured into the base pay of the new contract at the start of
the agreement.
It is clear from the foregoing examples that the management of a
financially troubled enterprise can only gain by disclosing information to
the unions with which it is trying to bargain. Apprised of impending
disaster, unions tend to work with management to save the business, and to
save jobs for the employees they represent.
This Article rests upon the fact that cooperation between labor and
the management of more successful enterprises could also be enhanced by
disclosure of additional information to unions. Rather than trusting
management to resist excessive demands, the union would have the
information necessary to determine for itself whether the wages for which
it is pressing would endanger the health of the enterprise and whether an
increase in efficiency could be exchanged for higher pay. The union could
cooperate with management to build a strong enterprise that would benefit
both worker and stockholder alike.
Unions are not the only force that seeks information from
management. Commercial and investment bankers, insurance companies,
and suppliers all exert financial pressure on management to disclose
details about the company. The most pervasive rights to information,
however, are exercised by government. Corporations falling within the
scope of the Securities Exchange Act 86 are responsible for supplying the
government with great masses of information, including methods of
accounting, assets and liabilities, and remuneration of directors. 87 The
Securities and Exchange Commission further regulates the contents of
proxy statements supplied to shareholders. It is not particularly relevant
that unions can gain access to this information simply by purchasing a
share of stock. What is important is that, in some contexts, management
can be forced to comply with clear invasions on what it asserts to be its
83. Id., July 19, 1979 at 4, col. 2.
84. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979 § A at I, col. 4, § D at 6, col. 3.
85. Id. § D at 6, col. 4.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1976).
87. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1976).
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property rights. Disclosure of information not now deemed "relevant" to
the bargaining process thus would present no greater burden than
management already bears.
The following not very far fetched hypothetical illustrates the
dysfunctionality of the current, inadequate disclosure requirements. In
December 1978, the Retail Clerks Union negotiated a new collective
bargaining agreement with Food Fair Company. Accurate reports that
Food Fair had entered into receivership had not yet been circulated, and
only management was aware of the company's precarious situation. Food
Fair never asserted an inability to pay claim during negotiations, and the
clerks were able to bargain for an approximately twelve percent wage
increase effective on or about February 1, 1979. The question is whether
the union, if informed of management's long-range plans for the
enterprise, would have pushed for such an increase or would have sought a
contract that provided for job security or a severance pay clause.
The Food Fair hypothetical exemplifies the obvious: a union cannot
play the game without knowing the rules. In this case, in which the rules
consist of the data that could enable the union to determine where to draw
the line on their demands, knowing the rules makes for fair play.
The hypothetical reinvokes the questions as to the scope of relevance
and mandatory subjects of bargaining which opened this section.
Although the decision to close a plant for economic reasons is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining,8 8 the Board and courts should be willing
to accept the argument that given the duty to bargain over a severance pay
clause, the long-range prospects of the company are relevant and necessary
to decide whether presently to bargain for severance pay or to seek an
immediate wage increase. Moreover, the union needs to know about
ultimate plans for plant expansion or contraction because such plans are
relevant to bargaining about seniority.
The very existence of these types of questions and the conceivable
variance in answers that could result depending upon whether one plugs
them into the cooperative or the antagonistic model of labor relations
illustrates the imperfect attempt to define the duty to disclose in terms of
bargainable subjects and live grievances. If collective bargaining is to be
seen as a purely antagonistic relationship, then a restrictive approach to
the standard of relevance, by which a union is forced to establish a close
nexus between its request for information and a bargainable subject, will
have the effect of continuing the distrust and fear of incursion into the
affairs of the other side. Yet if antagonism is the desired goal, a relevance
standard may be necessary to permit the system to perpetuate itself. It
would appear that once a union is allowed to reflect upon its relationship
with management from a holistic perspective, some notions of cooperation
may filter into the system. One could imagine a purely cooperative system
88. Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1964).
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in which the union's interest in the enterprise is no longer wholly self-
serving, but rather is cast in terms of formulating its demands to secure the
most propitious combination of benefits for its members and advantages
to the enterprise. In that situation the standard of relevance would be
devoid of significance since "relevance" would encompass virtually all
information that the union might seek or that management might offer to
attain that end. It is the author's contention that, by expanding the concept
of relevance to support these more attenuated requests for information,
the system could absorb the subtle interjection of elements of cooperation
on an almost experimental basis, thereby allowing the parties, without
having to face an articulate choice, to reflect upon their ability and
willingness to move towards a cooperative system of labor-management
relations on a full-scale basis.
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR REGULATING DISCLOSURE
Having determined that disclosure of information can be a valuable
step towards promoting union-management cooperation, alternative
means for promoting this goal must be considered. The balance of this
Article will explore the potential for regulating disclosure in order to
reconcile the statutory framework of the National Labor Relations Act,
which serves as the bulwark for the collective bargaining relationship.
A. European Models
A useful starting point is to examine how this problem has been dealt
with elsewhere. The focus of this section will be three European statutes
that impose explicit disclosure requirements on employers.
1. Great Britain
The Employment Protection Act of 1975, supplemented by the British
Code of Practice on Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions for
Collective Bargaining Purposes,89 is the regulatory force at work in Great
Britain. The Act imposes on the employer a duty to disclose to the
recognized union all information without which the union would be
materially impeded in carrying on collective bargaining90 "in accordance
with good industrial relations practice.'91 Guidance on the meaning of
"good industrial relations practice" is provided by the Code of Practice. 92
The Code gives examples of relevant information that should be
disclosed. The examples may be broadly described as falling within the
areas of pay and benefits, conditions of service, manpower, performance,
89. Advisory, Conciliation, & Arbitration Service, Code of Practice 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Code of Practice].
90. Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 17(l)(a).
91. Id. at § 17(1)(b).
92. Section 17(4) of the Act contemplates the creation of the Code.
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and finances,93 and go well beyond those deemed "presumptively relevant"
by the NLRB.94 Included is much of the information that the author
believes is necessary for the harmonious development of American labor
relations.
The British employer's obligation to disclose continues throughout
the collective bargaining process;95 a request may be presented to the
employer before, during, and after the agreement is reached and regardless
whether a contract is in force at that time.96 Since trade unions in Great
Britain must be recognized by an employer in order to bargain about each
matter, 97 the scope of information that is available to the union is
coterminous with that recognition.9" the union can apply for expanded
recognition,99 and, if the application is approved, the duty to disclose
expands commensurately.100
Disclosure, however, is subject to several broad defenses, which
potentially can swallow up the duty and defeat the purpose of the Act.
Specifically, an employer may withhold:
(a) any information the disclosure of which would be against the interests of
national security, or
(b) any information which he could not disclose without contravening a
prohibition imposed by or under an enactment, or
(c) any information which has been communicated to the employer in
confidence, or which the employer has otherwise obtained in
consequence of the confidence reposed in him by another person, or
(d) any information relating specifically to an individual, unless he has
consented to its being disclosed, or
(e) any information the disclosure of which would cause substantial injury
to the employer's undertaking for reasons other than its effect on
collective bargaining, or
(f) any information obtained by the employer for the purpose of bringing,
prosecuting or defending any legal proceedings. 101
Finally, the employer has what amounts to a defense of undue burden-it
need not directly produce or copy any documents other than those
prepared to convey the information, or compute any such data if the cost
or work required is out of proportion to the data's value for collective
bargaining purposes.
102
93. Code of Practice, supra note 89, 11.
94. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
95. Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 17(1).
96. See Note. The Employment Protection Act 1975-Collective Aspects, 39 MOD. L. REv. 169,
178 (1976).
97. Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 12.
98. Id. at § 17(2)(a), (b).
99. Id. at § 12.
100. Id.
101. Id. at § 18(1).
102. Id. at § 18(2).
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2. West Germany
In West Germany, the major role in collective employee representa-
tion at the plant level is assigned to an institution that is legally distinct
from, but in practice closely allied with, the labor unions-the Betriebsrat
or works council.'0 3 West German law requires the employer to furnish the
works council with information necessary to discharge its duty. 0 4 For
example, because the works council is required to accept employee
complaints and to attempt to remedy them with the employer,'0 5 it must be
informed of the employer's actions in handling the complaint. 0 6 The
works council is also entitled to receive written records of accident
investigations and of inspections and discussions relating to work safety
and accident prevention,10 7 in which the council is also required to take
part.
108
In addition, the employer must inform the works council about
planning of changes . in working areas, procedures, and routines, in
technical facilities, or in jobs.109 The council must also be given
comprehensive data on personnel planning, 110 including data on both
current and future personnel demands.'
German law also provides for the establishment of a Wirtschafr-
sausschuss, or economic committee, in companies with more than one
hundred employees. The committee must consult with the employer on
financial matters and report its results to the works council."3 In this
103. SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER & GERALDSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN WEST
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 92 (Mich. International Labor Studies Vol. III 1969).
104. The general duties of the works council as defined by statute are:
I. to see that effect is given to Acts, ordinances, safety regulations, collective agreements,
and work agreements for the benefit of employees;
2. to make recommendations to the employer for action benefitting the establishment and
the staff;
3. to receive suggestions from employees and the youth delegation and, if they are found to
be justified, to negotiate with the employer for their implementation; it shall inform the
employers concerned of the state of the negotiations and their results;
4. to promote the rehabilitation of disabled persons and other persons in particular need of
assistance;
5. to prepare and organize the election of a youth delegation and to collaborate closely with
the said delegation in promoting the interests of the young employees; it may invite the
youth delegation to make suggestions and to state its views on various matters;
6. to promote the employment of elderly workers in the establishment;
7. to promote the integration of foreign workers in the establishment and to further
understanding between them and their German colleagues.
Law of Jan. 15, 1972 [1972] BGB I 113 (W. Ger.) § 80(1).
105. Id. at § 85(l).
106. Id. at § 85(3).
107. Id. at § 89(4).
108. Id. at § 89(2), (3).
109. Id. at § 90.
110. Id. at § 92(l).
111. Id.
112. Id. at § 106(1).
113. Id.
1980] DISCLOSURE OF ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL DATA 459
connection, the employer must timely furnish the economic committee
detailed information about the company, including information on the
company's economic and financial situation; its production, sales, and
investments; new working methods; a reduction in operations, shutdown,
relocation, or merger of the company; and any other circumstances that
may materially affect the employees' interest."14 This duty to disclose,
however, applies only if it does not endanger the company's-technological
and business secrets.'15
3. Belgium
The Belgian statute" 16 goes furthest in requiring disclosure to workers'
representatives. In Belgium, the enterprise council (conseil d'entreprise),117
composed of representatives of both management and labor, 18 must be
informed of a complete range of information relating to the enterprise.
Members of the council, which operates as a deliberative and cooperative
body of codetermination to review and establish policies relating to the
employees and their welfare, 19 must be given data such as the company's
current market position, its financial structure, personnel expenses,
budget, the calculation of the cost of production, and prospects for the
company's future. 120 The enterprise council, subject to agreement by all
parties, may summon the use of experts for investigation or clarification of
technical points. 12' The basic data must be made available within two
months after the members are elected to the enterprise council, 22 with
annual reports supplied within three months following the closing date,
but prior to the shareholders' meeting, with supporting documents in the
nature of updates to the basic information and financial statements
supplied fifteen days prior to the meeting of the enterprise council.1
23
Finally, the employer must provide quarterly reports 124 and independently
inform the council of any external events or internal decisions of
114. Id. at § 106(3).
115. Id. at § 106(2).
116. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, relative to the communication of financial information to the
enterprise council [1975] 3 LEs CODES LARCIER 310 [hereinafter cited as Decree of Nov. 27, 1973]. See
also Smith. Disclosure of Information: Can Britain Learnfrom Belgium, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 20
(July 1977).
117. The board, here styled "enterprise council," is similar to the works council in Germany. For
the sake of clarity, the Belgian board will be called by a different name. "A[n] [enterprise] council
consists of at least two . . . employee representatives, an equal number of alternate or substitute
representatives, the employer, and one or more of his representatives and their alternates." J.-P. DE
BANDT. CCH BUSINESS GUIDE TO BELGIUM 807 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DE BANDT].
118. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, ch. 1, art. 3.
119. DE BANDT, supra note 117, at 807.
120. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, ch. 2, art. 4.
121. Id. at ch. 9. art. 34.
122. Id. at ch. 2. art. 4.
123. Id. at ch. 3. art. 16-17.
124. Id. at ch. 4. art. 24.
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consequence to the enterprise. 125 The German Works Constitution Act,
while similarly operative without any triggering by the union, merely
requires that the representatives be informed within a"reasonable" time.
2 6
4. Comparisons
Despite the variations among these three statutes, a bare reading2 7 of
their language reveals several important distinctions that set them apart
from American labor law. Although differences in worker welfare
organizational structure distinguish England's statute from the two
continental nations, all three countries have articulated the need to inform
the workers' representatives of a broad range of company activities. In
contrast to the American practice of forcing the union to prove relevance
to a mandatory subject of bargaining, disclosure in the European nations is
an affirmative duty, with the burden on the employer to justify any
avoidance of its obligation.
Part of the reason European employers acquiesce in the broad
regulation of disclosure is their implicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the
collective structure. The parties deal with each other in a relationship
premised on notions of shared responsibility and the right of workers to a
voice in the enterprise, whether expressed through collective bargaining, as
in Britain, or through organs of codetermination, as in Germany and
Belgium. Given a recognition of this mutuality, it is less intrusive for the
legislature to regulate it; the spirit of cooperation at once prompts and
supports the broad disclosure rules, which in turn strengthen cooperation.
This spirit has not developed in American labor relations, and
acceptance of the collective structure has not, thus far, been enthusiastic.
The transition of labor unions from "criminal conspiracies ' ' 28 to chosen
representatives of employees has been a troubled one.129 The Wagner Act,
for example, reflected the need to protect the right to organize; at the same
time, however, the range of potential problems relating to collective
bargaining was recognized and the National Labor Relations Board was
created to encourage collective bargaining and to promote industrial peace
under the broad contours of the statute. 30 The legislation, as interpreted
by the NLRB, serves as the underpinning for an uneasy industrial peace. It
does not, however, infuse American labor-management relations with a
spirit of cooperation.
125. Id. at ch. 5, art. 25.
126. Law of Jan. 15, 1972 [1972] BGBI 1 13 (W. Ger.) §§ 90, 106.
127. That is to say, without regard to how they work in practice. Thus, the author does not
consider problems of enforcement, as, for example, that of the Belgian statute, which was reportedly
not being complied with by half the employers three years after enactment. Smith, supra note 116, at
23.
128. 3 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59-248 (1910).
129. GORMAN, supra note 45, at 3-5.
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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B. American Alternatives
An obvious alternative to the present American system of labor-
management relations would be congressional action modeled after the
European statutes previously discussed. Legislation, however, is a slow
process whose end product tends to be a vague and ambiguous reflection of
the compromises reached by countervailing political forces. This
observation is particularly relevant to disclosure, which is a matter of low
congressional priority. Unions have not pushed hard to gain access to
additional information. Therefore, the likelihood that the legislature
would act with any speed or clarity is optimistic. In a situation in which the
parties feel less than a total commitment to the collective structure as such,
the time spent by both sides trying to evade vague requirements would strip
the legislative efforts of their vitality. An alternative to legislation, and the
only realistic approach under the circumstances, is to look to the NLRB,
which was a conscious effort by Congress to deal with Labor relations, to
provide regulatory leadership within the scope of its congressionally
delegated authority. 131 In the past the Board has regulated disclosure by ad
hoc determinations in unfair labor practice proceedings. 132 This method
has been a failure. The Board has managed to avoid looking at the problem
in its totality, and the principles that the Board has developed lack the
coherence necessary to guide not only the conduct of unions and
management, but that of lower echelon members of its own staff.13 This is
particularly true when the issue of disclosure is but one small part of a
broad unfair labor practice proceeding. In addition, the Board's tendency
to affirm or reverse summarily the administrative law judge offers an
opportunity for management to evade disclosure by avoiding any
reference to its inability to pay, or by merely asserting the lack of relevance
of the information requested. The creative union, on the other hand, will
structure its demands to create some relationship, no matter how
attenuated, to a mandatory subject of bargaining. These possibilities for
manipulation and obfuscation preclude the development of consistent
regulatory policy, a prime rationale espoused during the New Deal era for
the development of administrative agencies such as the NLRB.1
34
Moreover, the Board's own procedures prevent it from seeing the
problem as a whole. The General Counsel initially must, based on an
131. Although many such broad delegations have been questioned as unconstitutional, see, e.g.,
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958). the question may turn on whether the particular legislative power is one which the framers of
the Constitution intended for Congress alone to exercise. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS & LEGITIMACY 86-88
(1978). It seems unwieldly to construe the commerce clause, the constitutional basis of the National
Labor Relations Act, as embodying a uniquely congressional power that would force Congress itself to
face and resolve all problems of industrial relations.
132. See, e.g.. cases cited in note II supra.
133. Only about 4% ofall unfair labor practice charges actually reach the Board. The balance are
resolved at an earlier stage. GORMAN, supra note 45, at 9.
134. JAFFE & NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 168 (4th ed. 1976).
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investigation of the facts and the parties before him, decide whether to
issue a complaint.135 If the union believes it has no right to the information,
it is likely to avoid the cost in time and money of going before the General
Counsel in the first place, and the Board will never be given the
opportunity to adjudicate that particular disclosure question. Even when
the union does come forward with a meritorious charge, the General
Counsel may prefer to wait for a better set of facts before litigating the
question. 116 Finally, the often cryptic nature of the opinions issued when
an unfair labor practice is litigated fails to provide the General Counsel
with a clear guide for his decision whether to institute suit.117 A decision
not to issue a complaint, even when it is based on a mistaken interpretation
of the Board's opinion, precludes any review of the issue.
Adjudication, however, is not the only way in which the Board can
proceed. Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the
Board "from time to time to make, amend and rescind in the manner
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act."1 33
Since its inception, the Board has exhibited a disinclination toward this
procedure, despite much criticism for viewing itself solely as a quasi-
judicial body139 and despite the advantage that rulemaking provides in the
pursuit of cogent and consistent policy. It is unclear whether the Board
could do better by rulemaking than it has by adjudication. It is submitted,
however, that, given the observed failure of adjudication, the only way in
which a cogent policy of disclosure can be developed is for the Board to
engage in rulemaking pursuant to the requirements of section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
It has been over thirty years since the Board first addressed the issue of
disclosure. The Board, however, has never promulgated rules applicable
either to disclosure in particular, or to labor-management relations in
general.1 40 Nevertheless, rulemaking encourages the Board to view the
issues in a broader context, to go outside the confines of a record, and to
consult with anyone who is in a position to offer guidance.
141
As a procedural matter, the Board must publish notice of its intent to
engage in rulemaking, and must give all interested persons an opportunity
to participate by written submissions or oral presentations, at the Board's
135. National Labor Relations Act §§ 3(d), 10(b), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(b), (d) (1976).
136. See Silverberg, Informal Procedures of the National Labor Relations Board, 6 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 72 (1954).
137. See Bernstein, The NLRB Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 576 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein].
138. National Labor Relations Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
139. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.03 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
140. Baker, Policy By Rule or Ad Hoc Approach, Which Should it Be? 22 LAW & CoNTmIP.
PROB. 658 (1957).
141. Bernstein, supra note 137, at 589-93.
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option. 42 The Board within thirty days must publish a proposed rule.
141
After the proposed rule is formulated, the Board can request further
comment and repeat the above procedure.
144
Any disclosure rule that thus is formulated need not be inflexible. It
should, however, be structured with sufficient specificity to offer labor and
management the assurance of predictability and uniformity of treatment
while also leaving open the opportunity to formulate exceptions in light of
the parties' real need for information, their ability and trustworthiness
concerning its ultimate use, and whether the information is so sensitive and
confidential that disclosure will constitute a threat to the enterprise.
45
Unlike the effect of stare decisis on adjudication, section 6 of the National
Labor Relations Act empowers the Board to repeal the rule if, upon
reevaluation, it is found to be ineffective.
1 46
A correlative advantage of rulemaking that stems from the promotion
of uniformity and predictability is its ability to decrease litigation. The
parties have access to the rule published in the Federal Register, and no
longer need to guess about where they fit into the ever-changing body of
case law.' 48 This increased clarity is at the same time apparent to the
Regional Counsel's office, which can encourage informal settlement,
thereby saving time and money while reducing ill feelings between the
parties. If a dispute arises during the course of bargaining, the union could
request a decision of the Regional Counsel concerning its entitlement to
the data prior to the filing of an unfair labor practice charge. Similarly, if
an unfair labor practice charge is filed, the Regional Counsel's function
would be to inform the parties of their rights and duties with respect to the
requested information, and then either consent to the withdrawal of the
charge if there is no violation, or urge the employer to provide the
requested information to the union.
49
The final asserted benefit of rulemaking, that it avoids retroactivity,150
does not clearly apply to the regulation of disclosure. Even the prospective
application of a rule thirty days after its effective date'5 ' will be retroactive
in the sense that it might apply to documents prepared by the employer
142. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), (c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1976).
143. Id. at § 553(d).
144. Id. at § 553(e).
145. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301
(1979). held that the secrecy of aptitude tests and answers sought by the union must be protected
against leakage. Id. at 315. No indication is given as to the potential scope of this holding.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
147. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
148. See GORMAN, supra note 45, at 17 (Board announces new principles of law, and repudiates
old ones, through adjudication).
149. Just as there is no private right to sue under the National Labor Relations Act, there is no
private right to withdraw a charge, or settle one after it has been filed with the office of the Regional
Counsel. See Silverberg, supra note 136, at 74.
150. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 137, at 598-602.
151. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(d), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
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much earlier and without any knowledge that it would be required to
supply them to the union. For example, a summary analysis of certain
detailed inventory figures undertaken before the rule becomes effective
might be the subject of a disclosure request. Such a neat summary, even if
created for the convenience of the employer, may well be of much greater
use to the union because of its ease of comprehension and succinctness.
The future effect of the rule, or even official discussion of a rule, may be to
curtail the amount of data that the employer will commit to paper in the
future. The retroactivity of an administrative rule is, however, significantly
less than the retroactive effect of adjudication. Rulemaking procedures
give to an employer significant advance notice to evaluate the information
in its possession, and to destroy that which it feels should be denied to the
union. Furthermore, given the length of time necessary to promulgate a
new rule, employers merely could cease to compile sensitive documents at
the outset of the rulemaking process. By balancing the purported evils of
retroactivity against the conduct that the statute seeks to prevent, the
value of a rule promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, by which a discernible framework for this aspect of the duty to
bargain in good faith could be set forth, outweighs the minimal retroactive
burden on the employer.
C. Proposed Rule
The method of disclosure contemplated by this proposed exercise of
rulemaking power should be triggered upon the request of a union for
information, rather than through forced disclosure by management at
various intervals. The Employment Protection Act of Great Britain, for
example, becomes operative only upon the request of the union. 53 The
statutes of Belgium and West Germany, on the other hand, contain
mandatory language with no requirement that a request emanate from the
workers.154 Under Belgian law, the basic data must be made available
within two months after the members are elected to the enterprise
council, 155 with annual reports supplied within three months following the
closing date, but prior to the shareholders' meeting, with supporting
documents in the nature of updates to the basic information and financial
statements supplied fifteen days prior to the meeting of the enterprise
council. 5 6 Finally, the employer must provide quarterly reports157 and
must inform the council of any external events or internal decisions of
consequential importance to the enterprise. 58 The German Works
152. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
153. Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 17(1).
154. See Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, ch. 2, art. 4; Works Constitution Act § 106(2).
155. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, ch. 2, art. 4.
156. Id. at ch. 3, arts. 16, 17.
157. Id. at ch. 4, art. 24.
158. Id. at ch. 5, art. 25.
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Constitution Act, while similarly operative without any triggering by the
union, merely requires that the representatives be informed within a
reasonable time.159
Conditioning the obligation to disclose on a union request is a realistic
requirement. Many American unions are understaffed and such
organizations would be unable to utilize effectively reams of data
mandatorily disclosed. Moreover, the authority of the Board to formulate
this rule stems from its power to regulate and define good faith bargaining.
Absent the capacity of the union to use the data, or any articulated need or
desire of the union to inspect it, it would appear that the Board would be
forcing the parties into conduct that exceeds its power under section 6 of
the National Labor Relations Act. Disclosure upon request, while
maintaining the flexibility and predictability sought in a rule, permits the
union to make a good faith determination of its need in light of its ability to
make use of the data, thereby preserving the spirit of sections 8(a)(5) and
8(d).
Available at the request of the union should be all economic data
regarding operation of the enterprise, including but not limited to the
broad areas of: wage and wage related data, methods of financing the
enterprise, production related data, market position, and any long range
forecasts concerning the future of the enterprise. Once unions are capable
of being apprised of changes in management's position, they should be
capable of adjusting their grievances and demands to the realities of the
situation.
The obligation to disclose relevant information must remain in force
during the entire term of the collective bargaining agreement, irrespective
of whether there is a grievance pending or a new collective bargaining
agreement being negotiated. Intelligent performance of the union's
function does not begin or end at any particular time and the Board must
remain true to its philosophy that collective bargaining is really an ongoing
process. 16 A properly drafted rule with predictable consequences will
allow the parties to determine quickly their rights and to map out a strategy
for the duration of the relationship. Moreover, to the extent that
communications remain open throughout the duration of a collective
agreement, the likelihood of industrial peace increases.
Notwithstanding the clear benefits of a more informal collective
bargaining environment, management should not be required to disclose
information if it is demonstrated that substantial harm to the enterprise
would result from disclosure in a particular case or that the information
requested by the union never existed. If, under the rule, management, since
it is in command of the facts necessary to substantiate its defense, resists a
legitimate request for information, then in a subsequent adjudicative
159. Works Constitution Act §§ 90, 106(2).
160. See GORMAN, supra note 45, at 455.
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proceeding management would bear the burden of proving substantial
harm based on the special circumstances.
D. Remedies
1. Violations by the Employer
Faced with a management refusal to disclose, the clearest course
available to a union would be to file an unfair labor practice charge. While
it was suggested above that automatic disclosure was untenable161 to
provide unions with information in the first instance, an order requiring
disclosure would be an appropriate remedy when an employer wrongfully
refuses to comply with legitimate requests. Upon finding a violation, the
Board would order the employer to turn over the requested information.
Upon a finding of repeated violations, the Board might formulate some
continuing mandatory scheme of disclosure similar to the Belgian model
or it can tailor a remedy for the particular employer and union. The
remedies envisaged by the statutes of West Germany and Belgium may
prove unsatisfactory if applied in the context of American labor-
management relations. The Works Constitution Act makes failure to
comply with disclosure obligations a minor offense, punishable by a fine
not exceeding DM 20,000 (the equivalent of approximately $10,200
American). 162 A violation of the Belgian Royal Decree can carry with it
either a fine or a penal sanction. 63 A fine or penal sanction may be
appropriate when the value of collective relations is already recognized
and the effect of the remedy is to put teeth into the statutory requirements;
the same punitive measures, however, would do little to promote the
cooperation that is a goal of the rule in the first place. Fines steep enough to
force future compliance by management would foster resentment and
hostile compliance. Moreover, heavy penalties would subvert the goal of
cooperation. The remedy logically should be consistent with the ultimate
purpose of the rule.
The British sanction for nondisclosure entails a more intricate
procedure, by which the trade union files a complaint with the Central
Arbitration Committee (CAC),164 which may refer the issue to the
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). If no settlement is
reached, CAC determines whether the complaint is well founded, and if it
is, issues a declaration accompanied by an explanation of its action. The
employer is given a second chance to comply, and if he fails to do so, the
trade union can bring a further complaint to CAC, which will once again
make a determination and state its reasons for ordering disclosure (if that
161. See text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
162. Works Constitution Act § 121.
163. Law of September 20, 1948 for the Organization of the Economy, Section V, 3 LES CODES
LARCIER 299 (1975).
164. A judicial type board will hear issues if conciliation cannot be reached. See Employment
Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 10.
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is its decision). If CAC finds this further complaint to be valid, it can make
an award ordering the employer to institute disclosure according to such
terms and conditions as CAC deems appropriate.
65
Although section 10(c) of the NLRA gives broad remedial powers to
the NLRB, 6 6 this authority must be viewed within the contours of the
statute as a whole. Inasmuch as the duty to bargain in good faith does not
require the parties to reach an agreement, it would be incongruous to allow
the Board to impose an agreement upon the parties. Nevertheless, the
Board could order the production of data or, in the event an employer will
not or cannot comply with an order to disclose and if the disclosure issue
pertains to a current bargaining problem, could force the parties to bargain
to impasse on the disputed point. If the issue is not a "live" one,
management could be required to meet with the union and ascertain the
union's need for the information, substantiate the unavailability of any
documents, and/or either supply the union with the missing information
or reconstruct that which the union can prove was once in existence. While
this remedy, although feasible, is fairly weak, the alternative, a unilateral
order to disclose, would raise cries of protest from management. 67 Thus,
given the Act as it now exists, disclosure and discussion are the practical, if
not ideal, remedies.
2. Obligation Upon the Union
a. Duty to the Employer
To insure that the enterprise's competitive interests are protected, any
rule promulgated should impose an obligation of confidentiality upon the
union with respect to the information disclosed. If this obligation can be
read into the union's duty to bargain in good faith, it ostensibly is subject to
the Board's section 6 rulemaking power. In acquiring information, the
union officials are placed in an altered position in relation to the company.
When they are entrusted with this information in the interest of promoting
intelligent bargaining and cooperation with an employer, they are at the
same time made privy to the internal workings of the company.
The fine line between legitimate use of information by a union and
explbitation, when good faith becomes an issue, is imminently clear in the
situation in which a powerful union that represents employees in the plants
of various employers within one industry. The possibility of the union
requesting information from one employer and then using it as a device to
obtain leverage in bargaining with another employer is not remote. Since
such abuse by a union negates all justifications for broad disclosure, a
union must be held to a standard of care with respect to its handling of
disclosed information.
For example, Union X is the statutory collective bargaining
165. Id. at §§ 19. 20. 21.
166. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
167. See CULLEN AND GREENBAUM. supra note 37, at 1-3.
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representative of the workers in Companies A, B, and C, who compete for
the same market. Union X requests that the management of each company
supply the union with long-range business forecasts. From these forecasts,
the union learns that while Company A will be forced to close two of its
plants within the next five years due to their continued unprofitability,
Companies B and C are having no such difficulties. An unscrupulous
Union X could at some point in the bargaining process inform Companies
B and C of A's plight in order to push B and C to pay higher wages on the
theory that they will be able to gather A's share of the market after A closes
its plants. Union X clearly has used information entrusted to it by A to
better its position with B and C, perhaps by inducing B and C to push A to
an earlier grave. Although Union X may have attained benefits for its
members who are employed by B and C, it has commensurately sacrificed
the interests of the employees who it represents at Company A. By its
actions, X has negated all the justifications for broad disclosure. To avoid
this distasteful result and to maintain the integrity of the system, X should
be held to liability not only for its possible antitrust violation'68 but also for
breach of a standard of care.
The duty of confidentiality that would be imposed upon a union by
the proposed rule is intended to temper the possibilities of such abuse.
One line of reasoning upon which to draw in fashioning this duty is to view
the union as holding the information as a type of fiduciary of the
bargaining process and, in an attenuated manner, of the company itself.
Since access to the information does not give to the union officials control
over the business decisions of the company, the fiduciary analogy is
imperfect. What it does illustrate, however, is that a union, by requesting
information, is voluntarily assuming this added burden, which may place it
in a potential conflict of interest and in danger of dissipating corporate
assets. In its use of information obtained from management, a union
therefore should be held to the standard of care that a prudent person
would exercise in the management of his affairs. Such a negligence
standard would render a union liable for any losses to the company that are
proximately caused by the union's misuse of information. Damages could
include the forfeiture of any gains for which the union was able to bargain
as a result of its use of the information. Although a negligence remedy for
misuse of information would be a private cause of action available to the
injured employer, remedies might also be made available through the
NLRB. Through such administrative remedies the Board could order the
union to cease misuse of the information or to relinquish control over it,
and possibly invoke sanctions against the officials involved in the misuse.
Future requests for information by the offending union also could be
168. Some of the more egregious activities that might be undertaken by a union are probably
within the ambit of antitrust legislation. Cf. United Mine workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657(1965)
(union forfeits exemption from antitrust liability when it agrees with one set of employers to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units in a multi-employer unit).
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subject to increased scrutiny because the employer in all likelihood would
be able to show the potential for substantial harm by disclosure.
b. Duty to the Union Membership
When a union is performing its role as the statutory bargaining
representative of the employees, the proposed disclosure rule would enable
it to act with new and powerful insight. Any increased ability to obtain and
use information in negotiating and administering a labor contract,
however, must concomitantly carry with it an increased liability to the
union membership to exercise the power fairly on their behalf.
That a union owes such a duty of fair representation to its members in
negotiating and administering a collective bargaining agreement is
unquestioned. 169 As first announced in Steele v. Louisville Railroad,170 the
duty of fair representation imposes upon the majority bargaining
representative an obligation to fairly exercise the power conferred upon it
by statute to protect the interests of all members of the bargaining unit
without discrimination. 171 The duty is not absolute, however; the Supreme
Court has recognized that, because of the multitude of interests within the
purview of a union's representative status, variations in the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement must be permitted, even though resulting
in disparate treatment, so long as the variations are based upon relevant
differences. 172 More recently, the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca v.
Sipes173 established that a breach of the duty of fair representation will be
found only if the union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, hostile, or in
bad faith.
174
With the duty articulated, it is possible to conceive of two stages at
which the union could incur liability in the context of the proposed broad
disclosure requirements. It has been posited that an employer's obligation
to disclose will extend only to such information as the union may request.
The first level at which the duty might be imposed relates to the nature of
the union' s request. The union may totally abdicate its responsibility to its
membership by failing to make any requests for information in the belief
that its members will charge it with playing footsy with management.
Alternatively, the union might tailor its requests to avoid confronting a
particular issue that might prove troublesome in the context of bargaining
or grievance adjustment. For example, returning to the Food Fair
hypothetical, with the universe of information that would be available
under the proposed rule, could the members assert a breach of the duty of
fair representation if the union had failed to explore detailed financial
169. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
170. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
171. Id. at 202-03.
172. Id. at 203.
173. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
174. Id. at 190.
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records and long-range forecasts of the enterprise and instead bargained
for a handsome wage increase? How much information must a union
request to protect all employees equally? Does a union's failure to request a
particular piece of information constitute merely a negligent omission of
its duty to bargain or does such a failure rise to the level of knowing
discrimination?
The last question raises particularly difficult considerations when the
failure to request a particular item of information affects one group of
employees in an irrelevant or invidious fashion. This would be the case
when there are a few older employees in a plant composed primarily of
young married workers. The union presses for information regarding
available types of medical coverage to see if it can work out an optimal
family plan for its members, but neglects at this time to explore whether the
various plans cover retired employees. The older employees may now be in
the position to assert that the union's representation of their interests was
unfair.
The second level at which the duty of fair representation may impose
liability upon a union in the context of requests for disclosure involves the
situation of a union requesting and obtaining information but either
failing to use it all or putting it to an improper use. This instance-which
may be described as a breach of commission, as distinguished from the
breach of omission previously discussed-raises the question whether a
union can totally deny the existence of certain information in its possession
and proceed to bargain for increased benefits, without regard to the
resulting effect on employees or enterprise stability. Such patent
abnegation of relevant criteria surely would rise to the level of arbitrary,
discriminatory, or bad faith conduct.
Somewhat different considerations arise in the normal context of a
union operating in a conflict of interest situation, comprised of balancing
the interests of particular groups of employees against the larger interest of
the employees as a whole. When the union is armed with broader-based
information to enable it to engage in more finely tuned bargaining, these
differences become more apparent. In the instance of the plant in which the
average age of the employee is fifty years old, should the union be put to the
more stringent standard of showing the relevance of accepting a wage
increase at the expense of lessened retirement benefits? Although the
practical effects are difficult to envision since the present American system
of labor-management relations has no experience with using broad
disclosure, the union theoretically should be prevented from denying its
obligations by avoiding information that might reveal the irrelevancy of
bargained differences in the treatment of employees or might force the
union to engage in a more difficult calculation during the next bargaining
session. The situation could well arise in which a union would be put to the
herculean task of defending each item or decision with hard-core data
obtained or obtainable from management.
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Furthermore, a union will be charged with developing the technical
and analytical skills necessary to interpret the masses of information
available to it. Given the burden, however minimal, placed upon
management to supply the data, and the dangers of leakage if the materials
are inadequately protected by the union, mere possession of information
by the union, without more, seems pointless. As a result, it would seem just
to equate possession of information with a union's need to engage in
intelligent bargaining and to treat any failure to analyze obtained
information in the same light as a decision to avoid any item of arguably
relevant information.
Despite the appeal of holding a union liable in these situations, the
likelihood of a member proving a violation would be small, absent some
extension of at least the broad parameters of the information to the
employees. Under Belgian law, the workers' representative to the
enterprise council must furnish the information to the employees and must
take steps to protect its confidentiality. 175 The West German statute, on the
other hand, imposes this obligation on the employer.1 76 At a minimum, a
procedure by which the union members are informed of the categories of
information that are obtained by the union would facilitate the ability of
the employees to prove those instances in which the union had avoided or
ignored relevant information or had otherwise acted in a proscribed
manner. 177
While it appears clear that, in the context of a union's duty of fair
representation, the standard of arbitrary, discriminatory, hostile, or bad
faith conduct will remain the general rule, 178 it is less clear whether a mere
negligent failure to request or use information will also constitute a breach
of the duty. 7 9 Since a union will need to develop expertise in dealing with
broadly disclosed information and will be unable at first to appreciate the
depths to which the information can be used and its breadth of availability,
imposition of a mere negligence standard at the inception of regulation
would impose an unfair burden on the union. As the area becomes
increasingly well defined, however, a negligence standard may prove to be
the only appropriate way to insure that unions recognize the consequences
of their obligation to their membership and to promote the successful
inculcation of the ethos of cooperation.
Apart from considerations of the duty of fair representation, there is
the possibility that extension of information to the employees may result in
an impediment to the collective bargaining process. Conceivably, a union
might encounter increased resistance to ratification of a proposed
175. See text accompanying notes 116-26 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 103-15 supra.
177. Some type of discovery proceeding, such as that which is available when charges are filed
asserting a breach of the duty of fair representation, should be made available.
178. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
179. See GORMAN, supra note 45, at 719-21.
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collective bargaining agreement that it has negotiated on behalf of its
members. The rank-and-file is composed of various interest groups who, in
an environment of broad disclosure, would have access to information to
support their points of view. When the union can present a proposed
contract in a sufficiently vague manner to cloud the choices that might have
been available to it, it may have fewer problems of acceptance by the
members. However, if it becomes more obvious to the membership that the
union had another rational choice available to it, and if the members have
information to support one alternative as opposed to another, they may be
more reluctant to accept the choice arrived at by the union. Furthermore, if
there is one interest group that merely wishes to stir up controversy, the act
of giving to it more information will merely serve to exacerbate the debate
and to confuse the issues prior to ratification. The potential result of this is
an inability by the various groups to appreciate the necessary compromises
that are reflected in any tentative labor contract.
Thus, labor also will emerge from any attempt at regulation with
added burdens. It must also be subject to heightened obligations and
liabilities to insure that it comprehends and acts in accordance with the
responsibilities attending broad disclosure. A recognition of the
weightiness of these concerns and of the potential for abuse by both labor
and management can serve to deepen appreciation for the benefits of
cooperation between union and management and to make disclosure a
successful tool of labor relations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Any system of collective bargaining is premised upon an
underlying assumption about the relationship of the parties to the
bargaining process. That assumption can take the form of one of two
competing models of labor relations, which in turn affects the rules by
which the parties must live. The cooperative model views collective
bargaining as the means to achieving ends that are mutually beneficial to
management and labor. The confrontation or antagonistic model, on the
other hand, views collective bargaining as an adversary process in which
there can be but one victor and the parties must fight it out to determine
who will be the winner.
The form that regulation of disclosure follows must be predicated
upon the model that the system has adopted. At present, American labor
relations are entrenched in the antagonistic model and all rules have been
framed with that model in mind. The interesting questions arise when one
considers using disclosure as a device to move subtly from antagonism to
cooperation without causing any strife to the collective bargaining
relationship as a whole. That is, while a requirement of wide-open
disclosure ideally may serve the ends of cooperation, in an antagonistic
system it may work merely as a device to harass management into
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providing reams of data that will remain unused. If, however, disclosure is
subject to reasonable limitations and sanctions for noncompliance or
miscompliance, and if the parties are forced into both disclosure and
acceptance of the information regardless of their desires, then they may be
forced into a more rational decision making process and into a gradual
change of perspective.
Full disclosure of economic and financial data makes possible a more
rational collective bargaining system that enables unions to assess and
evaluate management proposals knowledgeably and to frame their own
demands realistically. Whereas present collective bargaining practice
places a premium on gamesmanship and secrecy, bargaining through full
disclosure facilitates reasoned and informed decisionmaking. It is
proposed that the NLRB systematize and expand present disclosure
requirements by promulgating administrative rules pursuant to its
statutory rulemaking power. The adopted rules should provide that the
duty to disclose is triggered by a union request for information subject to
legitimate employer defenses.
An important benefit of the proposed disclosure rules is the prospect
that the openness and mutuality of interest underlying the proposed rules
will carry over into other areas of labor-management relations. It is vital
that the parties to collective bargaining recognize their interdependence
instead of engaging themselves in antagonistic posturing.
The proposed disclosure rules interpose a higher level of labor-
management cooperation into the collective bargaining process. With the
seed of cooperation thus planted, labor and management can determine
whether cooperation can form the future basis for American labor
relations.
I
